(SARS) epidemic prompted more than half a million people to take to the streets in protests demanding democracy. (4) and expanding the Legislative Council from 60 to 70 members, with one additional seat for each of the five geographical constituencies, and another five to be elected from among the District Council members. Later in November 2005, the Chief Executive also initiated discussions on the models, roadmap, and timetable for implementing universal suffrage through the appointed Commission on Strategic Development.
In the following month, pro-democracy legislators vetoed the electoral reform package. They could not accept that both the central government and the HKSAR government had refused to provide a concrete roadmap and timetable for the implementation of universal suffrage for the election of the Chief Executive and the entire legislature. They were also against the retention of appointed and ex-officio members in the District Councils.
The defeat of the HKSAR government's electoral reform package meant that the existing electoral methods would continue to apply. The prodemocracy movement believed that Beijing and the HKSAR government had no sincere intention to implement genuine democracy in Hong Kong, while the pro-Beijing united front attacked the pro-democracy groups for blocking progress in electoral reforms and delaying the democratisation on process. Meanwhile, from the end of 2005 to mid-2007, the Commission on Strategic Development continued its task.
The HKSAR government released the Green Paper on Constitutional Development on 11 July 2007 to consult the public on the options, roadmap, and timetable for implementing universal suffrage for the elections of the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council. On 12 December 2007, Donald Tsang submitted a report to the NPCSC. Meanwhile, opinion surveys in Hong Kong in the past decade or so have consistently showed that around 60 percent of the population support the prompt implementation of universal suffrage for the elections of the Chief Executive and the entire legislature (referred to as "dual universal suffrage"). The pro-democracy groups that have been demanding immediate implementation of "dual universal suffrage" also succeed in securing about 60 percent of the votes in the direct elections to the Legislative Council (they won even more votes in earlier elections). Hence, the Donald Tsang administration in its report to the NPCSC acknowledged that more than half of the public supported the implementation of "dual universal suffrage" in 2012, although it also pointed out that introducing universal suffrage to the Chief Executive election no later than 2017 would stand a better chance of acceptance by the majority of the Hong Kong community.
The NPCSC soon announced its "Decision on Issues Relating to the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive of the HKSAR and for Forming the Legislative Council of the HKSAR in the Year 2012 and on Issues Relating to Universal Suffrage" on 29 December 2007. The decision stipulated: "The election of the fifth Chief Executive of the HKSAR in the year 2017 may be implemented by the method of universal suffrage; that after the Chief Executive is selected by universal suffrage, the election of the Legislative Council of the HKSAR may be implemented by the method of electing all the members by universal suffrage."
The Donald Tsang administration and the pro-Beijing united front have since been arguing that the timetable for implementation of "dual universal suffrage" has been set. But the pro-democracy movement is certainly right in criticising this as far from a concrete timetable and firm commitment; they argue that the decision of the NPCSC may be interpreted as follows: "If the conditions are ripe, then the 'dual universal suffrage' may be implemented by 2017 and 2020 (the date of the Legislative Council elections following the Chief Executive election in 2017); and if the conditions are not yet mature, caution is advised and delay may be prudent."
Further, the nomination procedure of the Chief Executive election remains controversial. According to Article 45 of the Basic Law, the "ultimate aim is the election of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures." It is generally expected that the existing Election Committee electing the Chief Executive will then serve as the nominating committee; and according to Article 4 of Annex I to the Basic Law: "Candidates for the office of the Chief Executive may be nominated jointly by not less than 100 members of the Election Committee. Each member may nominate only one candidate." The Election Committee is expected to have 1,200 members in 2012, with 300 members elected from each of the following four sectors: industrial, commercial, and financial sectors; the professions; labour, social services, religious, and other sectors; members of the Legislative Council, representatives of district-based organisations, Hong Kong deputies to the NPC, and representatives of Hong Kong members of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).
Since the elections to the Election Committee are heavily biased in favour of the establishment, the pro-democracy movement may not be able to win enough seats in the nominating committee to nominate its candidate; i.e., if the threshold for nomination is set too high, there will not be genuine competition, and the people of Hong Kong can only elect someone from a shortlist of candidates approved by the Chinese leadership.
Hong Kong people well remember that in the election of the Chief Executive in 2002, a change of procedures made the Election Committee's nomination of candidates an open process. As a result, more than 700 members nominated C. H. Tung, and there were not enough votes left to nominate another candidate; Tung was elected for second term on an ipso facto basis. Then, in the election of the third term Chief Executive in June 2005, the pro-democracy movement candidate, Democratic Party chairman Lee Wing-tat, could not even secure the 100 votes necessary to qualify as an official candidate. In the fourth term Chief Executive election in 2007, the pro-democracy movement candidate, Alan Leong Kah-kit, managed to qualify as an official candidate and engage in debates with Donald Tsang, who was seeking re-election. But the pro-democracy movement only secured between 130 and 140 seats in the Election Committee, and it would have been extremely difficult for it to do better.
Proposals from pro-Beijing united front figures, including members of the Committee for the Basic Law of the HKSAR under the NPCSC, have alarmed the pro-democracy movement. These suggestions use the pretexts of orderly competition and ensuring the broad representativeness of the candidates to block the presentation of a candidate from the prodemocracy movement. Most of these proposals aimed to raise the nomination threshold; for example, nomination should require the endorsement of 200 (25 percent) instead of 100 members of the nomination committee, nomination should require the endorsement of a specific number of representatives from each the four sectors, and nomination should require the support of a number of Hong Kong deputies to the NPC. In response to these proposals, the pro-democracy movement has demanded that the nomination threshold for candidates in the Chief Executive election should be no higher than the existing one.
Regarding the elections in 2012, the NPCSC decision in December 2007 stipulates that universal suffrage would as before apply to only half of the seats of the legislature. Further, half of the seats would still be returned by functional constituencies, and the procedures for voting on bills and motions in the Legislative Council would also remain unchanged. The latter actually means that the majority of functional constituency seats would retain veto power over initiatives by pro-democracy legislators.
In the eyes of the Hong Kong community, if the scope of electoral reforms is so limited for the elections in 2012, how can one expect significant progress in the years after 2012 and before 2017 and 2022? There are suspicions that the Chinese authorities have been adopting delay tactics, postponing the crucial issues of electoral reform until 2015 or 2016. Various statements made by key establishment figures soon after the release of the Political Reform Proposals have raised strong doubts as to whether the Chinese authorities are really determined to abolish functional constituencies by 2020. On 20 November 2009, Maria Tam, a Hong Kong deputy to the NPC and a member of the Committee for the Basic Law of the HKSAR under the NPCSC, indicated to the media that if the Legislative Council seats returned by functional constituencies conform to the principle of equality, they would qualify as election by universal suffrage; she further stated that universal suffrage would be defined by the central government in Beijing according to the Basic Law, and not in line with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. (5) A day earlier, Chief Secretary Henry Tang Ying-yen (a leading contender for the Chief Executive post in 2012) declared that a system of "one man, two votes" would still be "fair and equal" if everyone had a chance to vote in the functional constituencies. (6) Hence, the abolition of functional constituencies has become the most important theme in the present campaign for genuine democracy.
In the electoral reform process in recent years, the autonomy of the HKSAR government appears to have been eroding. During Donald Tsang's campaign for re-election as Chief Executive in early 2007, he told journalists that he would "engage in a tough game" to settle the challenging issue of political reform. In his first policy address after re-election, he stressed that he had a constitutional duty to resolve the question of political reform in the territory. After the release of the Political Reform Proposals in late 2009, however, both central government officials and the Tsang administration indicated that Hong Kong did not have the authority to tackle political development beyond 2012 in the political reform package. So, when did the Donald Tsang administration lose the authority to handle political reform beyond 2012? When did the central government take back this authority from the HKSAR government? Both the central government and the HKSAR government still owe Hong Kong people an explanation.
When Hong Kong people study the Basic Law, their understanding has always been that amendments to the method for selecting the Chief Executive after 2007 require the endorsement of a two-thirds majority of the full legislative Council, the consent of the Chief Executive, and the approval of the NPCSC.
Similarly, amendments to the method for forming the Legislative council can be made only with the endorsement of a two-thirds majority of the full Legislative Council and the consent of the Chief Executive; and it has to be reported to the NPCSC for record.
There are no stipulations in the Basic Law that the HKSAR government must seek the authorisation of the NPCSC before it can tackle the roadmap and timetable for political reforms beyond the present term.
During the drafting of the Basic Law, Hong Kong people were not aware that there had been such discussions on the prerequisite of NPCSC authorisation. Nonetheless, it is apparent that the HKSAR government must seek the NPSCS's authorisation before it seeks to abolish functional constituencies in the Legislative Council by 2020.
Maria Tam's statement on universal suffrage in Hong Kong also raises serious questions. Was the HKSAR government consulted on this? If so, why didn't the Donald Tsang administration consult the Hong Kong community, or at least inform it of the "new policy"? It is certainly inappropriate to have such a significant decision revealed to the Hong Kong people during a television talk-show.
There were rumours within local media circles in mid-2010 that some pro-Beijing legal experts in Hong Kong were working to produce a definition of "universal and equal representation" applicable to the territory's future political reform packages. There was no indication whether the Donald Tsang administration was involved in this work.
After meeting the democratic Party delegation on the political reform issue, Li Gang, deputy Director of the Central Liaison Office in Hong Kong, was at pains to explain to the media that his office was not a "second governing team" in the territory. (7) This was actually the first local press conference by the leadership of the Central Liaison Office; why should Li Gang consider the issue of the "second governing team" something to be clarified in this first press conference, when no reporter raised the issue? Certainly he realised that many Hong Kong people had this perception; and it was more than the "personal comment" made by his former colleague Cao Erbao in an article published in the Study Times of the Central Party School in Beijing. (8) When the central government authorised the Central Liaison Office to meet with the pro-democracy group in Hong Kong, it should have carefully considered whether these groups should assume the role of receiving messages from the entire Hong Kong community and serving as a bridge be- tween Beijing and Hong Kong on the issue of political reform. If this was indeed the case, then it should have observed the principles of openness and high transparency instead of selectively meeting some pro-democracy groups based on united front considerations.
Beijing's strong influence
Hong Kong people understand that the issue of electoral reform will be determined in Beijing and not by the HKSAR government. Symbolically, the protest rally for democracy held on 1 January 2010 abandoned the usual route and chose the Central Liaison Office, the representative of the central government in Hong Kong, as its destination. It is expected that more pro-democracy protest rallies will target the Central Liaison Office in the future. (9) The community also realises that the Chinese leadership is reluctant to grant genuine democracy to the territory. Although a significant majority of Hong Kong people is in support of democracy, it is unwilling to confront Beijing. In view of the hard-line position, most Hong Kong people tend to return to their traditional apathy. After all, the community is basically satisfied with the status quo of stability and prosperity and is reluctant to sacrifice it in the pursuit of democracy.
When President Hu Jintao visited Macau in December 2009, he openly stated that the central government gave "a high rating" to the work of the outgoing Edmund Ho Hau-wah administration and its contribution to Macau and the nation. (10) When Hong Kong's Chief Executive, Donald Tsang Yam-kuen, made his duty visit to Beijing at the end of the month, he was told by Premier Wen Jiabao to resolve "some deep-rooted conflicts" in Hong Kong society and was asked by President Hu to handle the territory's constitutional reforms "in an appropriate manner." (11) Premier Wen's remarks were broadly viewed as a public rebuke. Apparently the central leadership is happy with the situation in Macau and dissatisfied with the political and social contradictions in Hong Kong.
What, then, is the political situation in Macau? There was only one candidate, Fernando Chui Sai-on, in the 2009 Chief Executive election, and therefore no competition and no public debate. Once Beijing indicated that it had a preferred candidate, the issue was settled. Much more shocking was the earlier election of the Election Committee -there were only 300 candidates to fill the same number of seats, hence no competition, no campaigning, and no formal election.
The so-called Macau Street political culture is often described as follows: Macau is a small place, and nearly all community leaders of any standing are related to one another in some way. Electoral competition and controversy are to be avoided for the sake of future co-operation and maintaining harmony within the community. Organisations outside the establishment have secured only three seats in the legislature, and there is a limit to their political participation and mobilisation.
The domination of the establishment and the lack of a developed civil society can be attributed to two factors. First, the local mass media are almost totally controlled by the establishment. Macau's media do not criticise its government or the Chinese government. Macau people have ample access to Hong Kong newspapers, radio, and television -none of which carry much news about Macau. The only independent media to be found are in the Portuguese or English languages, serving the relatively small expatriate community. Second, almost every recognised civic group in Macau receives generous financial support from the government, which in turn has been enjoying ample revenue from the casino industry in recent years. Even the powerful Catholic Church has to maintain good relations with the government in order to maintain its impressive social services. The only outlets for social grievances are occasional protest rallies, such as on May Day, which are usually confined to livelihood issues. Hong Kong is still quite different. All parties concerned appreciate that rule of law and freedom of information are essential to the territory's functioning as an international financial and business services centre. If these two assets are severely eroded, Hong Kong will become just another Chinese city with no edge over Shanghai and other coastal cities. But the lesson of Macau is clear: unless Hong Kong people work hard to protect their rights, civil society can degenerate. Some of the hallmarks of Macau politics are beginning to emerge in Hong Kong. Self-censorship in the media is becoming increasingly serious; rational, in-depth discussion of political issues is becoming much less frequent. The public is becoming more apathetic politically, expressing their grievances mainly through protest actions to make headlines.
In the long-term, Hong Kong people realise that the territory's economy is increasingly dependent on that of the mainland (see Table 1 ). This rising dependence has been accompanied by a relative decline in Hong Kong's international economic competitiveness. Over the past decade, the leaders of Shanghai have no longer looked to the territory as a model for emulation; they have turned their eyes to New York and London. At the time of Hong Kong's return to China in 1997, the Guangdong authorities were eager to establish closer economic ties with the HKSAR, but Hong Kong's top civil servants wanted to avoid a high degree of economic integration with the mainland and were cool to Guangdong's overtures. In recent years, Guangdong has been following in the footsteps of Shanghai, trying to attract investment from multinational corporations listed in the Fortune 500. The value of Hong Kong as an economic partner has thus been falling. In sum, dependence on the mainland and the decline in relative bargaining power has exacerbated Hong Kong people's willingness to accept Beijing's position on the territory's electoral reforms.
At the same time, Hong Kong people's confidence in China's future continues to strengthen (Table 2) . Apparently this is related to their increasingly positive perception of mainland China's international standing. A public opinion survey conducted by the New Youth Forum in March 2009 revealed that 86 percent of the respondents thought that China had considerable international influence; about 77 percent believed that China would definitely or possibly overtake the US as a world superpower within 50 years; 80 percent felt that China was a peace-loving country; and 60 percent believed that China's development would not threaten the AsiaPacific region. (12) The successful Beijing Olympics certainly helped; and most Hong Kong people believed that China, in contrast to the US, emerged from the recent global financial tsunami with its international status improved.
The recent economic difficulties and political controversies have nevertheless undermined the Hong Kong community's trust in the central gov- ernment and its confidence in "one country, two systems" (see Table 2 ). Given that the territory's economy is heavily dependent on the mainland economy and the central government's policy support, and that the HKSAR government was chosen by China's leaders, Hong Kong people might have held the central government responsible for the performance of their economy and government. But obviously the trends have been positive since 1997. In recent years, Hong Kong people's trust in the central government has been considerably higher than its trust in the Hong Kong government, in contrast to the situation in the 1990s before the return of the territory to China. In a survey in December 2008 (one of the series recorded in Table 2 ), 56 percent of the respondents said they trusted the central government. By comparison, 42 percent of the respondents indicated that they trusted the HKSAR government, and 19 percent indicate that they distrusted it. The 14 percent gap between those who trusted the central government and those who trusted the HKSAR government was the greatest since the end of 2003. (13) In early 1996, an opinion poll conducted by the Chinese University of Hong Kong revealed that 42 percent of the respondents trusted the British A similar pattern emerged in various surveys on the same subject in the 1990s. Hence, the Chinese authorities should be satisfied with the achievements of its united front charm offensive in the territory. This trust in the central government and confidence in "one country, two systems" implies that Hong Kong people are less inclined to demand democracy as a checks and balances mechanism against Beijing, in contrast to the mentality of "the exploitation of democracy as a bulwark against communism," which hit its peak in the wake of the Tiananmen Incident in June 1989. (15) In terms of Hong Kong people's identity, there have been positive changes in the long-term trends from Beijing's point of view, though the changes are more limited. As shown by themselves as "Chinese citizens" rather than "Hong Kong Chinese citizens"; again there was a reversal of the trend from mid-2008 to mid-2009. A more perplexing phenomenon is that the strength of identity of Hong Kong people as Hong Kong citizens and as Chinese citizens have both been rising, though the latter again showed a small decline from mid-2008 to mid-2009. Stronger identification as "Chinese Hong Kong citizens" and "Chinese citizens" on the part of Hong Kong people may mean that they are more willing to accept reducing the differences between the territory and the mainland.
The influence of the pro-Beijing united front has certainly been expanding rapidly since 1997. The resources at its disposal have been most impressive. The Chinese authorities and the HKSAR government can reward united front activists with decorations, honours, prestigious positions such as deputies and delegates to the National Committee of the CPPCC as well as local counterparts, and appointments to various advisory committees of the HKSAR government. In many ways, the united front is becoming the most influential social club in the territory, where one can establish business ties and raise one's social profile. Deputies to the NPC and delegates Even grassroots leaders such as mutual aid committee chairmen of public housing estates have been treated to visits to the mainland, where they are pampered by local officials. All of this easily explains why the pro-Beijing Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB) claims a membership of well over 10,000, while the largest pro-democracy party, the Democratic Party (DP), has a membership of about 600, with only about one third remaining active. It is also significant that the DP and the Civic Party (CP), another pro-democracy party with strong appeal to liberal middle-class professionals, do not have any mid-level executives of major corporations as their formal member. While almost all major enterprises in Hong Kong have significant business activities in mainland China, their mid-level executives do not want to be associated with pro-democracy political parties that are critical of the Chinese authorities. As most of the media in Hong Kong are in the hands of the major business groups, self-censorship has been on the rise since the 1990s.
Since the mid-1980s, the pro-Beijing united front in Hong Kong has been gradually building an effective election machine in support of its candidates in various elections. Its mobilisation power and sophisticated cam- The Chinese leadership is trapped in a fundamental dilemma. It has been trying hard to support Hong Kong economically in line with the ultimate objectives of ensuring political stability and demonstrating to the world that Beijing can administer the territory better than London. This active support and intervention has made Hong Kong people aware of their dependence on the Mainland, but they are also concerned with maintaining checks-and-balances mechanisms through support for the pro-democracy movement. Since Chinese leaders understand that they lack complete control over Hong Kong's political scene, they have been reluctant to allow genuine local democracy. They therefore have failed to win the hearts of those who still vote for the pro-democracy candidates in elections, and must absorb part of the blame for the unsatisfactory performance of the local government. In another survey during the same period, 34.6 percent of the respondents indicated that they would vote for Donald Tsang (if they had the right to vote and the election was to be held tomorrow), while 48.5 percent said that they would not. ties and the bad performance of the HKSAR government have a spill-over effect on the community's trust in the central government and its confidence in "one country, two systems." More significant still, Chinese leaders' influence and intervention in Hong Kong have destroyed the appeal of the "one country, two systems" model for Taiwan.
The HKSAR government's legitimacy deficit
The British colonial administration won its legitimacy by performance. (18) Even today, many Hong Kong people still compare it favourably with the C. H. Tung and Donald Tsang administrations. After 1997, the Chinese authorities responded to the political crises in the HKSAR by offering strong economic support. Their rationale was simple: if the economy improved, the people would largely be satisfied and they would be much less interested in democracy. Political stability would no longer be challenged.
When Donald Tsang visited Beijing on his duty trip in December 2006, he told the central government that "Hong Kong's economy is the best it has been in almost twenty years." (19) Many Hong Kong people disagreed, however, even in the period of economic boom. Based on the views expressed in various radio phone-in programmes, people did not feel they had benefited from economic growth in recent years.
A study by the Bauhinia Foundation, a think-tank close to Donald Tsang, revealed that the median household income in 2005 was still 15.8 percent lower than that in the previous peak year of 1997. More serious still, between 1996 and 2005, the number of households with a monthly income below HK$8,000 rose by 76.5 percent, to more than 500,000; and their proportion of the total number of households rose from 13 percent to 22 percent. (20) According to the Census and Statistics Department, in June 2009, there were 0.3944 million workers earning less than HK$4,000 (about US$500) per month, compared with 0.3 million in 2001. (21) This low-income category, sometimes described by sociologists as the "working poor," mainly consists of workers without skills and of low educational qualifications. As more than 90 percent of the territory's GDP comes from the service sector, the decline in the manufacturing industries means demand for unskilled workers has been falling fast. The hourly wage at MacDonald's outlets (around US$2.5) is a good indicator of the surplus of unskilled labour.
A research project at the Chinese University of Hong Kong revealed that its comprehensive quality of life index dropped 3. Dr. Ohmae Kenichi believes the vast majority of Japanese will fall into the lower-middle class socio-economic group because globalisation will widen the gap between rich and poor and exacerbate social polarisation. Ohmae's arguments. The median monthly salary of new graduates is between HK$10,000 and HK$11,000; many also owe the government HK$200,000 or so in student loans. Unless they can depend on their parents for food and accommodation, they will have difficulty maintaining a middle-class lifestyle. Neither can they expect steady promotions or salary increases. Many still earn a monthly salary of HK$20,000 to $25,000 after more than a decade of employment and cannot achieve meaningful breakthroughs in their careers. Before 1997, unemployment was not a concern in Hong Kong. The community believed that anyone who was willing to work should have no difficulty finding a job. In recent years, it has had to accept an unemployment rate higher than those in the United States and United Kingdom. Hence, even those who are gainfully employed worry about the employment of their next generation.
The unemployment issue has been compounded by the widening gap between rich and poor. It has been reported that Hong Kong people have the highest individual net worth in the world, amounting to US$202,000. According to a global study by the United Nations' World Institute for Development Economics Research in 2006, Hong Kong was ahead of Luxembourg, Switzerland, and the United States, which ranked second, third, and fourth respectively, while Japan ranked ninth and Singapore twelfth. Table 7a ); in terms of this measurement of income distribution, Hong Kong compared rather unfavourably with developed countries, and was in a situation comparable to Argentina and Zambia (see Table 7b ).
Up to a third of Hong Kong's labour force has nine years of formal edu- cation or less; they will naturally find it difficult to benefit from the territory's economic growth. Exacerbated income inequality easily leads to a sense of grievance and possibly also to social instability. In the era of the British colonial administration, the free market led to the concentration of wealth and the unequal distribution of income. In the colonial political system, however, power was highly concentrated among the expatriate senior officials of the colonial government, who were perceived to be neutral, efficient, and largely free of corruption. This separation of political power and wealth in fact constituted a form of checks and balances. But since the return of Hong Kong to China, most people perceive a rapid expansion of influence over the HKSAR government on the part of the major business groups. The latter have experienced rapid asset growth and have significant investment projects on the mainland. They therefore enjoy good access to China's top leaders, who are eager to attract external investment as well as maintain investor confidence in Hong Kong. Business leaders' assessment of the HKSAR government's performance have apparently had considerable impact on Chinese leaders' evaluation of the Tung and Tsang administrations, which in turn have shown great respect for the interests of major local business groups.
In recent years, critics of the HKSAR government often illustrate the collusion between the government and local business interests with the following examples. Middle-class families spend their life savings on their accommodation, while real estate developers refuse to reveal the exact measurements of their flats. Working people make monthly contributions to their pension funds and various insurance schemes, but do not even know how much they are paying in commissions and management fees. Supermarkets provide false information on their discounts, and have not been sanctioned after media reports; worse still, consumers have no other options. These examples vividly reflect the oligopolistic control of the market by the territory's major business groups, while the government has been reluctant to introduce fair competition legislation to protect the interests of consumers and small investors.
The perception of government-business collusion has been exacerbated by the fact that many top government officials join major corporations soon after their retirement with very attractive remuneration packages. At the same time, the official advisory committee system has been dominated by a small elite of 300 or 400 people, including spouses and children of top business leaders. Worse still, some of them are so much favoured by the government that they sit on more than ten advisory committees, with their tenures extending beyond six years, in violation of established conventions.
From the very first policy address of C. H. Tung to the most recent one of the Tsang administration, the HKSAR government has been trying hard to maintain the territory's international competitiveness and a respectable economic growth rate. Obviously they have not been successful. In his last policy address delivered on 14 October 2009, Donald Tsang identified six industries with a strategic edge, and indicated that the government would support them with land grants and various subsidies. 
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Japan and the other "three little dragons of Asia," however, the HKSAR government does not control the banking and financial systems, nor does it possess state-owned investment funds and corporations to actively promote the development of strategic sectors. The Donald Tsang administration has therefore been perceived as ineffective even by the business community and the pro-Beijing united front. The legitimacy deficit of the HKSAR government largely explains why it has been trying to avoid controversial issues. In an ageing society with a sharply falling fertility rate, the financial burden of social services will increase. Taxation will rise in the absence of administrative reforms. At this stage, Hong Kong's Mandatory Provident Fund is inadequate to provide for the community's retirement, and Hong Kong people have yet to tackle the long-term financing of their hospital services. Both the Tung and the Tsang administrations have been reluctant to expand the taxation base and introduce a value-added tax and/or ask Hong Kong people to increase their contribution to the Mandatory Provident Fund and pay for their own medical insurance. These are unpopular though essential policy programmes that a government without an electoral mandate and which has not been performing well can easily postpone, with the burden ultimately falling on the people further down the road.
The challenges for the pro-democracy movement
The pro-democracy movement has been in a difficult state. There is considerable frustration with the lack of progress, as no one expects any breakthrough soon. Even the political parties in the pro-democracy camp do not believe that democratisation is an issue with much political appeal. They can make very little impact on the government's policy-making process because the Tung and Tsang administrations have enjoyed the backing of a safe majority in the legislature; they do not have to lobby for the approval of the pro-democracy groups, which are treated as the opposition. In fact, there has been little meaningful consultation between the pro-democracy groups and the government.
The sense of political impotence on the part of the pro-democracy groups has been exacerbated by Hong Kong people's growing trust in China (see Table 2 ). Attacking the Chinese authorities' infringement on the community's freedoms and human rights has become less attractive to voters than before. The most important concerns of Hong Kong people are obviously the economy and unemployment, and the pro-democracy groups are not perceived as having much to offer.
Before Hong Kong's return to China, there was substantial moral and public opinion pressure to maintain unity within the pro-democracy camp. Such pressure evaporated soon after July 1997. In the frustration of the political wilderness, differences in political orientations have been exacerbated and can no longer be contained. These differences are most evident in the responses to the recently released Political Reform Proposals. The Civic Party (CP) and the League of Social Democrats (LSD) proposed an implicit referendum on the Political Reform Proposals through the resignation of one pro-democracy legislator in each of the five geographical constituencies. By-elections would then have to be held, and the resigned prodemocracy legislators would seek re-election on a common single-issue political platform of rejecting the HKSAR government's Political Reform Proposals and demanding "dual universal suffrage" as soon as possible. The rationale for this proposal was that this was the only way to mobilise the entire electorate of the territory to indicate its stand on the issue of democracy and, hopefully, to demonstrate to the HKSAR government, the Chinese authorities, and the international community that the pro-democracy movement still enjoyed majority support among the Hong Kong population.
The Democratic Party (DP) and the other pro-democracy groups representation in the legislature refused to support the "pseudo-referendum" plan, however. They asserted that it was too risky precisely because the electorate was apathetic regarding the issue of democratisation, and any loss in the five geographical constituencies would tarnish the image of the pro-democracy movement. The DP and like-minded pro-democracy groups worried about the effective electoral machinery of the pro-Beijing united front, and openly stated the importance of retaining the veto in the legislature concerning the Political Reform Proposals. (26) The voter turnout rate for the Legislative Council by-elections on 16 May 2010 was 17.1 percent, with about 580,000 voters coming out to vote. As expected, both sides had scripts prepared and offered well-anticipated interpretations. (27) The Tsang administration and the pro-Beijing united front emphasised the low turnout and hence the failure of the "de facto referendum." Naturally they could report to the Chinese authorities that they had successfully discredited the campaign.
The crucial turning-point was Beijing's decision not to allow the pro-establishment parties to take part in the exercise. Chinese leaders obviously considered the "de facto referendum" a very sensitive precedent, and decided that the danger outweighed the potential of snatching one or two seats from the pro-democracy camp in the by-elections. In the end, the pro-establishment political parties refused to participate in the by-elections.
The Tsang administration was under pressure to do more to discredit the by-elections. Tsang's own decision not to vote certainly destroyed the neutrality of the executive branch in organising the elections of the legislature. It also compromised the spirit of the rule of law. Even if the administration believed that the legislators or political parties had exploited a loophole in the existing legislation by treating the resignations and the by-elections as a "de facto referendum," the government should still have followed the law, organised the elections, carried out the usual publicity work to encourage people to vote, etc. It could then consider closing the loophole afterwards.
A voter turnout rate of 17.1 percent was not a satisfactory performance for a "de facto referendum," but as a protest campaign, mobilising more than half a million people to say no to the Tsang administration's package of political reform proposals was quite an achievement, especially considering all the efforts to discredit the campaign by Chinese officials and the pro-Beijing united front. Meanwhile, Beijing continued to approach the democratisation issue only within a united front framework. On the day fol- 26. According to Annex I to the Basic Law, amendment of the method for selecting the Chief Executive "must be made with the endorsement of a two-thirds majority of all the members of the Legislative Council and the consent of the Chief Executive, and they shall be reported to the Standing Committee of the NPC for approval." According to Annex II to the Basic Law, amendment of the method for forming the Legislative Council "must be made with the endorsement of a two-thirds majority of all the members of the (Legislative) Council and the consent of the Chief Executive, and they shall be reported to the Standing Committee of the NPC for the record." The provisions were initially intended to make changes to the electoral system difficult, with the final decision-making power in the hands of the Chinese authorities; but these provisions also offer veto power to the pro-democracy legislators regarding any electoral reform proposals initiated by the HKSAR government, as long as they control more than 20 (one third) of the seats in the legislature. At present, they hold 23 seats in the Legislative Council.
27. See all major Hong Kong newspapers on 17 and 18 May 2010. lowing the by-elections, it was reported that central government officials would meet the Alliance for Universal Suffrage, an umbrella group led by the Democratic Party. It was subsequently revealed that the latter had indicated to the pro-Beijing united front earlier in December 2009 that it would be interested in a dialogue with the central government on the political reform issue. The dialogue surfaced after the Legislative Council byelections, and ultimately led to an agreement between the central government and the Democratic Party. The central government accepted the Democratic Party's proposal that the five newly-created functional constituency seats for the District Councils would be voted for by the entire electorate except for those already enfranchised in the functional constituency elections. In this way, every voter in Hong Kong would have two votes in the Legislative Council elections in 2012. According to the Political Reform Proposals of the HKSAR government released in November 2009, there would be five more directly-elected Legislative Council seats, one for each of the five existing geographical constituencies; and five more functional constituency seats to be elected among the District Council members, following the NPCSC stipulation that the two types of constituencies would remain equal in terms of numbers of seats. In return for the concession, the Democratic Party Legislators voted in support of the government's Political Reform Proposals, which were then endorsed by the legislature. Due to the change in position of the Democratic Party, the pro-democracy camp lost its veto power in the legislature this time. However, this veto power is expected to remain effective regarding the democratisation issue in general.
The voting outcome in the Legislative Council on 24 and 25 June 2010 split the pro-democracy movement. (28) The Democratic Party and its supporters argued that the establishment of a dialogue with the central government following the Tiananmen Incident in 1989 was an important breakthrough, that the concession made by the central government was significant, and that they would continue to struggle for the ultimate realisation of democracy in the territory. Those who voted against the government's Political Reform Proposals, including the Civic Party, the LSD, the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions, etc., insisted on a roadmap and a timetable, and considered the so-called "concession" by the central government to have increased both the number and the legitimacy of functional constituencies. There was also suspicion that the Democratic Party had refused to support the "pseudo-referendum" earlier because it had wanted to establish trust with the Chinese authorities to facilitate negotiations on political reform.
The chasm between the radical and conservative wings of the prodemocracy movement is now very clear. Since the Chinese authorities have no intention of allowing genuine democracy in the territory in the near future, there is no chance for the pro-democracy groups to form a government. Further, as indicated above, they have almost no influence on 
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Party the government's policy-making process. Under the circumstances, unity and discipline have decreasing appeal to politicians in the pro-democracy camp. Moreover, the multi-member, single-vote geographical constituencies in the Legislative Council elections exacerbate splittism. In the largest constituency, i.e., New Territories West, which returns eight legislators, a candidate can secure a seat with 8 to 9 percent of the votes cast. Hence, with the usual voter turnout rate at around 50 percent, a candidate can theoretically win a seat with the support of 4 or 5 percent of the constituency, as long as supporters can be motivated to come out and vote.
Moving towards a more radical position may contribute to a sharp image appealing to a sufficient minority of the electorate. The LSD apparently has been very successful in following this type of strategy; it certainly has been attracting a lot of media attention. At the other end of the pro-democracy political spectrum, the Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood avoids controversial political issues and concentrates on district work in Sham Shui Po. Their different orientations make solidarity within the pro-democracy camp more problematic.
There are other types of problems as well. The frustrations of many "young Turks" in the radical wing of the pro-democracy movement are related to bottlenecks in their political careers. The two municipal councils were abolished in 2000, and there are very limited chances of getting elected to the Legislative Council as the "old guards" hold on to their seats. Junior politicians therefore spend many years on the District Councils, where remuneration is insufficient to support full-time political careers.
These inter-party and intra-party differences within the pro-democracy movement became public over the "pseudo-referendum" issue. Mutual recriminations damaged the image of the entire pro-democracy movement while also discouraging its supporters. Worse still, the two founding elders of the DP, Martin Lee and Szeto Wah, had opposing views on the "pseudoreferendum." Szeto openly criticised Lee for his political immaturity, and accused youthful supporters of the "pseudo-referendum" of actually helping the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). (29) When the pro-democracy movement organised a rally protesting against the Political Reform Proposals on New Year's Day 2010, the turnout was not expected to be impressive, with a general estimate that around 10,000 people would take part. The turnout actually reached 30,000, due in part to the heavy sentence imposed on Liu Xiaobo. (30) Another surprise was the enthusiastic opposition to the HKSAR government's costly plan for a highspeed railway from Kowloon linking to the high-speed railway system on the mainland. The opposition came from young people referred to as the "post-80s generation," who exhibit strong dissatisfaction with the establishment but have little respect and trust for the pro-democracy political parties. (31) There was also an unexpectedly high turnout of about 150,000 (32) for the June 4 anniversary candlelight vigil in 2010, with many young people in attendance. The commemoration events in 2011 was similar; the organizers claimed that more than 150,000 people participated. The frustrations and dissatisfaction of the "post-80s generation" have attracted a lot of attention, (33) highlighting the exacerbating problems of widening income disparity, declining opportunities for upward social mobility among young people, and a perception of worsening social injustice as government policies are seen to favour major business groups. These problems certainly erode the legitimacy of the HKSAR government, especially when the related grievances are sharply articulated by activists of the "post-80s generation."
The expectations of the younger generation reflect the community's changing values and demands, and members of the "post-80s generation" probably consider both the government and the pro-democracy parties to have failed them. While the Tung and Tsang administrations have been lacklustre at best in their socio-economic policy programmes, the prodemocracy movement also feels the pressure of the perception that its concentration on political reform issues is inadequate and cannot attract the sustained support of the majority of the population.
Conclusion
Most Hong Kong people understand that Chinese leaders have no intention of allowing genuine democracy in the territory, but they are unwilling to confront the Chinese authorities and are reluctant to sacrifice for the cause of democracy because the status quo is tolerable. Political apathy and the sense of political impotence in the community have therefore been growing in recent years. The pro-democracy movement finds it increasingly difficult to mobilise the people, and frustration over the lack of progress has exacerbated and publicised internal division. A major breakthrough in the foreseeable future seems unlikely, while maintaining the momentum of the movement has become a daunting challenge. These pressures, along with the resourcefulness and effectiveness of the proBeijing united front electoral machinery, were keenly felt when many leaders of the pro-democracy movement appealed for caution and avoidance of risk in deciding against support for the "pseudo-referendum" proposal.
The difficulties of the pro-democracy movement have nevertheless not translated into advantages for the Tsang administration. Even the pro-Beijing united front is unhappy with the HKSAR government's performance, and blames its incompetence for the absence of an economic development strategy that would revive the territory's international competitiveness and relieve social polarisation. The Chinese leadership's hard-line position on political reform has exacerbated the legitimacy deficit of the Tsang administration, which is perceived by people on both sides of the HKSAR border as dependent on support from the Chinese authorities. Tsang's position has probably been salvaged by the fact that the Chinese leadership can hardly afford another forced resignation of a Chief Executive handpicked by Beijing.
Although Hong Kong people's confidence in China and their trust in the Chinese leadership as well as their identification with the mainland have been growing since the territory's return to China, the Chinese government's strong backing of the HKSAR has become a double-edged sword. Hong Kong people realise that decisions on local political reform are made in Beijing, and they also partly blame the Chinese authorities for the unsatisfactory performance of the HKSAR government, which is chosen by and accountable to Beijing.
The lose-lose situation can only be reversed by the Chinese leadership becoming enlightened and secure enough to allow genuine democracy in the territory. This is unlikely, however, as today's Chinese leaders still cannot accept erosion of the CCP's monopoly on political power, and the formula for political stability in China remains economic growth and an absence of democracy.
